My idea for a course in analytic philosophy of architecture was
the product of long- term, slow-burner inspiration, which began
roughly with reading Scrutons The Aes thetics of Architecture
and reviewing the available literature. These efforts revealed that
there is no significant body of work in the fieldin short,
that there is no such field. To begin to correct the situation,
one might seed interest in architectural aesthetics (and ethics)
among budding analytic philosophers, and in analytic aesthetics
(and ethics) among budding architects. Certainly work in this vein
was not springing forth from the deep wells of philosophical aesthetics.
Two decades after Scrutons first book on architecture, there
has been no more than a smattering of articles on architecture in
aesthetics journals (and another book by Scrutonthis one leaning
more towards criticism). The field remains largely underdeveloped,
and ripe for exploration. All the better to explore with the fresh
perspective students bring.
Not everyone subscribes to the philosophical enrichment theory
of curricular innovation, though. A primary hurdle in teaching analytic
philosophy of architecture is convincing architects, philosophers,
or deans that the subject merits a piece of the students course
loads. Students themselves are an easier sell, perhaps, because
they do not have a historically-informed notion of what their instruction
should look like. The great difficulty of teaching this material,
though, is finding the right pitch to a mix of philosophy and architecture
students. That there is no tremendous range of directly relevant
literature in analytic aesthetics need not be an obstacle in this
regard. One solution is to provide general introductions to subfields
of aestheticsrepresentation, intention, and identity, for
exampleand examine their applicability to and lessons for
(and from) architecture. With respect to architectural ethics, one
may look to architectural law to determine some of the pertinent
moral issues. The current thin state of the literature forces the
instructor to rely on readings of a broad, non-technical naturequite
suitable for an interdisciplinary student audience.
Finally, a word on pedagogy. Such courses as are taught to architecture
or arts students sometimes substitute visual-medium projects for
written projects as a basis for assessing performance. The thinking
seems to be that this is what is comfortable for arts and architecture
studentsa sentiment not terribly far from if they could
express themselves in writing, they wouldnt have set out to
do visual arts. We have a special responsibility to these
students, precisely because they have chosen to work in a visual,
non-discursive medium. We owe them an opportunity to better their
written skillsand critical thinkingfor they may get
no further formal training in these abilities. We should also expect
them to have missed much of the point of the philosophical enterprise
should they never get a chance to think philosophically
through the pen or keyboard.
Course Outline and Syllabus
This course is an introduction to philosophy of architecture in
the analytic philosophical tradition. The philosophy of architecture
incorporates not only aesthetics but also ethical aspects of architecture.
In the main, though, the aim of philosophy of architecture is to
see how the pressing questions of aesthetics are translated into
architectural terms: What is an architectural work? Are there architectural
classes or types? What is the role of intentionality and expression
for architects? What are rationally-justifiable foundations for
architectural criticism? The relevant ethical issues include the
delineation of rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and
justice in architectural milieux. There are, in addition, philosophical
issues arising out of the non-artistic facets of architecture; these
include architectures social and technological characteristics.
Some of these issues may seem familiar, either from writings in
architectural theory or some other corner of architectural studies.
But the approach of analytic philosophy to these issues will be
generally unfamiliar unless one has a background in philosophy.
This novelty is offered in the spirit of discovery and exploration
of uncharted territorywhich may be complimentary to the tradition
of architectural theory but is in any case not to be construed as
an attempt to offer a substitute for or corrective to it.
Why the Philosophy of Architecture?
Quite apart from the body of work that is architectural theory,
an interest in architecture has been emerging over the past few
years among professional philosophers. For architects, this philosophical
work represents a new and challenging intellectual frontier, for
several reasons. First, some of the most interesting new work is
in what is loosely known as the analytic tradition,
that is, the tradition of Western philosophy which places a high
premium on rigorous argumentation which optimally employs the tools
of logic and critical reasoning. In short, the literature of this
branch of philosophy tends towards the technical side of things,
and so is often perceived as unavailable to all but its fervent
devotees (not unlike, say, contemporary Western art music in the
serial and post-serial traditions). Second, while architects
may have some familiarity with analytic aesthetics, this knowledge
has not been adequately utilized in either the theory or practice
of architecture. By contrast, philosophers working in the continental
tradition have been recognized for their insights into such subjects
as what it means to experience architecture, and the social ramifications
of architectural practice. That element of Western philosophy may
indeed seem less rarified and more pertinent to the real world of
architecture (theory or practice).
However these perceptions of a philosophy of architecture may have
arisen, in the end professional architects should take note of what
analytic philosophers are sayingand what they should be saying.
Architectural theorists have a manifest interest in learning about
the efforts of analytic aestheticians to address such topics as
the essential nature of art and the identification of a given artwork.
With respect to the specialized nature of analytic aesthetics, there
is indeed an obstacle to quickly learning about it and its relevance
for architecture, because the field truly is technical,
which is to say that it features its own techniques. A semester-long
course should do the trick. Finally, continental aesthetics is no
more relevant to architectural thought than is analytic aesthetics.
Without debating the merits or flaws of continental philosophy,
it should be conceded that, for all its literary and alogical (not
illogical) characteristics, continental philosophy is more ready-to-hand
than is analytic philosophy. It does not follow that it is any more
pertinent or intellectually stimulating for architectsand
this lesson has not been lost on philosophers in the academy. The
price of avoiding analytic aesthetics is missing out on aesthetics
in the dominant tradition of Western philosophical thought, and
that seems an unfair cost for non-philosophers to burden.
It is only fair for architects to turn to analytic philosophers
at this point and ask where they have been all these years, and
the answer may be bluntly put as out to lunch. To the
extent that aestheticians focus on special arts (that is, instead
of talking about the arts generally), they have focused largely
on literature, painting, and music. In more recent years, film and
dance have sparked some interest (there is a decent web site on
the former, by the way) but architecture remains largely in the
analytic philosophical wilderness. Failing any rational explanation
(and I fear there is none), let us turn to the irrational suggestion
some philosophers might make that they do not have an intrinsic
interest in architecture, for it is simply part of their general
material environment which prima facie cannot compete with the realm
of ideas. This sort of view is one part homage to the Socratic academic
ideal of renouncing material interests in favor of purer philosophizing,
and one part intellectual chic. It makes little sense on either
count, because architecture is surely the first place (or at least
the first art form) where the ideal is incorporated into the material.
Perhaps a more plausible explanation (that is, excuse)
is simply that, for whatever reasons, there is no strong pre-existing
tradition of philosophy of architecture. Let us begin one, then.
Unit One: Aesthetics and ArchitectureRudiments and Essentials
Week One. What is philosophical aesthetics, and how is it distinct
from other approaches to aesthetics (e.g. psychological, social/commercial,
As a first step, it is a good idea to familiarize ourselves with
the general project of philosophical aesthetics. While architecture
is not traditionally a central concern for philosophers in the analytic
tradition, many of the issues raised in analytic aesthetics globally
have direct applications locally in architecture, which we will
try to tease out in this course.
Anne Sheppard, Aesthetics: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Art (Oxford University Press, 1987).
Arnold Isenberg, Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art,
in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (herein JAAC)
Week Two. Where is architecture in classical and contemporary aesthetics?
What do aestheticians in the analytic tradition typically think
of architecture? Given the relative dearth of analytic writing on
architecture, the answer might seem to be not much.
In what little discussion there is of architecture in analytic aesthetics,
the default position is apparently that architecture is so close
a relative of the plastic arts (painting, sculpture) as to warrant
the subsumption of the former under the latter. We might immediately
recognize that architectures foundational features and conceptual
problems cannot be wholly assimilated to those of the plastic arts.
But what is the exact sense in which they are independent? Might
they resemble the features and problems of some other area of inquiry,
such as the environment, as some have suggested?
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture (Princeton
University Press, 1979), chs 1 & 2.
Allen Carlson, Reconsidering the Aesthetics of Architecture,
in Journal of Aesthetic Education 20 (Winter, 1986).
F. David Martin, Architecture and the Aesthetic Appreciation
of the Natural Environment, in JAAC 38: 2.
Week Three. A metaphysical commencementwhat is architecture,
as practice and product?
A philosophical approach to architecture must offer, at an early
stage, at least some tentative suggestion as to what architecture
is, for several reasons. One, we should see whether architecture
truly needs to be considered as distinctive from other arts in philosophically-significant
ways. Two, architecture, like other arts, has process and product
dimensions, and even if architecture otherwise resembled other arts
generally, there is no prima facie reason to believe that these
dimensions vary in just the way they do in other arts (and our experience
tends to confirm this). This implies that suggestions as to what
architecture is are needed in order that we keep in sight our subject
matter (for further metaphysical discussion), whichever it is.
Stephen Davies, Is Architecture Art?, in Michael Mitias
(ed.), Philosophy and Architecture (Rodopi, 1994).
Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, ch 3.
Unit Two: Metaphysics in Full Bloom
Week Four. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
being an architectural work?
What are the essential hallmarks of a given individual architectural
work, such that we can identify (a) when some x is a work of architecture
(and not anything else, e.g. sculpture) and (b) when some x is a
particular work of architecture (and not any other)? Are these hallmarks:
conventional, subject to change, conceptually or empirically-determined,
Nelson Goodman, When is Art? in Ways of Worldmaking
Catherine Lord, A Kripkean Approach to the Identity of a Work
of Art, in JAAC 36: 2.
Michael Mitias, Ambiguities in Identifying the Work of Art,
in JAAC 38: 1.
Robert Wicks, Architectural Restoration: Resurrection or Replication?,
in British Journal of Aesthetics 34: 2.
Week Five. Are there classes of buildings or building-types?
We often take it for granted that buildings fall into classes or
types: skyscrapers, colonial houses, news kiosks, etc. Some aestheticians
suggest, however, that there are only individuals, and no classes
of any kind. How could this possibly be true of architecture? Would
it make a difference to architectural practice if it were true?
Nikolas Pevsner, A History of Building Types (Princeton
University Press, 1976).
Alan Colquhoun, Typology and Design Method, in Essays
in Architectural Criticism (MIT Press, 1981).
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Toward an Ontology of Art Works,
in Noûs 9 (May, 1975).
Richard Wollheim, Are the Criteria of Identity for Works of
Art Aesthetically Relevant?, in Art and its Objects, 2nd
ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1980).
Week Six. Architectural predicatesand their metaphysical
Philosophers often use the term predicate to talk about
qualities, features, or properties. The idea is to remain neutral
in speaking about the actual existence of qualities, features, or
properties, as opposed, for example, to the existence of the objects
they characterize. This neutrality is accomplished by referring
to a given quality of an object y (say, the redness of y) in terms
of a corresponding predicate, say r, where r is the predicate is
red). Then we can say y is characterized by r without committing
to the existence of r. What is motivating the device is the worry
that talk of qualities as existing somethings is absurd, though
many arguments have been advanced for the opposing view, too, and
in those cases the burden is to show exactly how we may speak of
So, too, for the special architectural predicatesmost prominently,
light, space, and formand those aesthetic predicates architecture
shares with other art forms (color, shape (generally), size, etc.).
How do these predicates characterize the architectural work? Do
they refer to existing qualities? How do we determine what qualities
there are in a work, and which are the most important in a given
Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts, in Philosophical
Review 68 (October, 1959).
Oswald Hanfling, Aesthetic Qualities, in Oswald Hanfling
(ed.), Philosophical Aesthetics (Blackwell, 1992).
Michael Mitias, The Aesthetics of the Architectural Work,
Louis Hammer, Architecture and the Poetry of Space,
in JAAC 39: 4.
Unit Three: Content and Value: From Thought to Building, and Back
Week Seven. Intentions and Intentionality.
It is a commonplace of thinking about architecture that ones
designs are a direct means of representing ones underlying
intentions, even if those intentions are construed in purely formal
or style-bound terms. As a consequence of this view, it is also
commonly held that buildings generally have an identifiable significance
or meaning. But are these theses detachable? Is there in fact a
defensible argument for either? In particular, what should architects
make of the suggestion by some aestheticians that there is no fool-proof
way to attach intentions to a given artwork, and that the exercise
is pointless in any case? What, in short, does architecture (as
product or process) look like without a premium on intentions?
William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional
Fallacy, in Joseph Margolis (ed.), Philosophy Looks at
the Arts, 3rd ed. (Temple University Press, 1987).
Nelson Goodman, How Buildings Mean in Philip Alperson
(ed.), The Philosophy of the Visual Arts (Oxford University
Week Eight. Architectural Expression.
There is a tendency to take expression in architecture
at face value, as in the phrase Ledouxs work expresses
the Enlightenment ideals of his age. That is, we generally
understand expression as synonymous with the rather
vague term, communication. Why is this excessively vague?
If we ask how Ledouxs work communicates anything, given that
it is literally a set of drawings or stones piled up in a particular
arrangement, we have at least the hint of a puzzle. Some may be
tempted at this point to simile: the work communicates some thought(s)
x just as, for example, a red octagonal sign with the word stop
communicates the imperative form of to stop. This is
a plausible beginning of a semiotic account of expression but it
should be noted at the outset that the whole enterprise rests on
an analogy posited with actual signs. Several serious accounts directly
assess the concepts and relations constitutive of expression without
resting on analogy, and so these merit our attention. These include
seeing expression as (1) a formal relation between aesthetic predicates
and the way they are instantiated (that is, realized in the actual
world), (2) a behavior-like phenomenon (verging on analogy, to be
sure), and (3) a causal relation between aesthetic predicates and
the cognitive or emotive properties they arouse in spectators. Do
any of these fit a reasonable characterization of architectural
Art, Expression in, Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Supplement. (Macmillan Reference USA and Simon & Schuster
and Prentice Hall International, 1996).
Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, ch 8.
Michael Mitias, Expression in Architecture, in Michael
Mitias (ed.), Philosophy and Architecture.
Saul Fisher, Expression in Architecture.
Week Nine. Traditional perspectives on architectural criticism:
Stylistic frameworks, formalism, and socio-political analysis.
The philosophy of art often characterizes artworks as individuals
without regard to any others. One motivation for this is that we
ought to be able to grasp the salient features of, for example,
the Steiner Haus, should we find it as a free-standing structure
in Alpha Centauri. This in turn suggests that consideration of stylistic
frameworks and socio-political environment are, at least philosophically-speaking,
beside the point. Yet it is not clear that, from this perspective,
formalism does much better. After all, if we really did discover
an interesting architectural work in a nearby galaxy, it wouldnt
occur to us to assess it in wholly formal terms because of the remaining
and sizable questions as to how it got there, and why. Much traditional
architectural criticism therefore comes under deep suspicion from
a variety of philosophical perspectives. Two questions arise: is
there a possible philosophical defense of any such critical framework,
and if not, can architecture do without?
Jenefer M. Robinson, Style and Significance in Art History
and Art Criticism, in JAAC 40: 1.
Deane W. Curtin, Varieties of Aesthetic Formalism, in
JAAC 40: 3.
Roger Scruton, Tafuris Marxism, and Architectural
Principles, in The Classical Vernacular: Architectural
Principles in an Age of Nihilism (St. Martins Press, 1994).
Week Ten. Architectural criticismThe case-study as a philosophical
Some three decades ago, Peter Collins proposed that architectural
analysis and criticism might be fruitfully modeled on the case-study
approachthen best known in law and elements of the social
sciences, and currently a staple of systems analysis and management
studies. His view begins with the suggestion that each architectural
work is an atomic individual the features of which are not necessarily
designed in accordance with particular principles and which neither
depend on past works nor determine future works in any essential
or fixed fashion. Yet the features of any given work exemplify the
salient particular consequences of and guideposts to greater, abstract
principles. Thus we can build an understanding of architectural
principlesor architecture, simplyby gleaning the lessons
of past works, which will shape our future designs through precedence
and innovation, by turns and temperament. The analogy with law is
clear enough, but what are its merits and flaws in an architectural
Peter Collins, Architectural Judgement (Faber, 1971).
Unit Four: Special Topics in Philosophy of Architecture
Week Eleven. Logic, language, and notation: Why there cant
be a language of architectureand what there can be.
Summerson, Zevi, Jencks, and many, many others talk of a language
of architecture. But does this concept make any sense? Is
it even a useful metaphor? Even if there is no point to talk of
a language of architecture, there is apparently one
sense in which architects must be interested in language, or linguistic
phenomena, at any rate. Like other artists, designers, and creators,
architects require a system of notation which allows for the preservation
of a works identity, and it seems that any such system exhibits
certain well-defined syntactic and semantic features, in a manner
analogous to those we associate with natural, logical, or computer
languages. What should such a language for architecture
Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, ch 7.
Martin Donougho, The Language of Architecture, in Journal
of Aesthetic Education 21: 3 (Fall, 1987).
Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Hackett, 1976).
William Mitchell, The Logic of Architecture (MIT Press, 1990).
Week Twelve. Architecture and the social: How is whatever distinguishes
the social from the individual manifested in an architectural work?
Architecture is apparently unlike the other arts in that we tend
to associate it with a social function. But what, if anything, makes
architecture intrinsically social? Is it simply that
the provision of shelter is generally not a self-sufficient affair?
These considerations help address foundational issues underlying
next weeks subject: whether the social nature of architecture
endows architects with special social responsibilities.
John Greenwood, The Mark of the Social, in John Greenwood
(ed.), The Mark of the Social: Discovery or Invention? (Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1997).
John J. Haldane, Architecture, Philosophy, and the Public
World, in British Journal of Aesthetics 30: 3 (July,
B. R. Tilghman, Architecture, Expression and the Understanding
of a Culture in Michael Mitias (ed.), Philosophy and Architecture.
Saul Fisher, Is Architecture a Social Art?
Week Thirteen. Architectural ethics, part one: responsibilities,
rights, and utility.
Responsibilities. We begin with a look at the AIA Code of Ethics,
which outlines obligations of architects, generally to other persons,
based on general canons which entail goals enshrined in ethical
standards, which are in turn further specified in binding rules.
Do the rules ensure that the given standards will be met? Are those
standards, or the canons on which they are based, reasonable to
begin with? What fundamental principles should motivate the choice
of canons? Further, very little (though not nothing) is said in
the AIA Code about historic preservation or environmental protection
(cultural and natural heritage)what ethical considerations
are relevant here?
Rights. Who or what has rights, why, and whose trump whose: environments,
communities, developers, builders, engineers, architects
Utility. The social character of architecture pits general utility
consideration against the preferences of the individual creatorthe
architect (these are now known as tilted arc cases,
after the controversy over Richard Serras work). How can preferences
be weighed justly in making controversial architectural decisions?
American Institute of Architects. Code of Ethics and Professional
Francis Sparshott, The Aesthetics of Architecture and the
Politics of Space, in Michael Mitias (ed.), Philosophy
Saul Fisher, How to Think About the Ethics of Architecture,
in Warwick Fox (ed.), The Ethics of Building (forthcoming).
Week Fourteen. Architectural ethics, part two: Principled considerations
of architectural law and business ethics for practices.
The law protects intellectual, domestic, and commercial property,
all to varying degrees and on the basis of quite distinctive principles.
This presents a problem for architects in that the principles involved
easily clash and thus generate dilemmas of an ethical and legal
nature. For example, if xs design D for a townhouse is bought
by developer y and built by contractor z, D remains the intellectual
property of x but is instantiated in the commercial property of
y, whose changes in D apparently violate the integrity of xs
creation. One may fruitfully compare the ensuing problems which
have emerged in the colorization of classic films. Aside from the
rights and damages questions which arise in legal considerations,
there are questions of the good (e.g. social or aesthetic utility)
and preference-weighting which are ethical at root.
Another set of ethical problems arises with respect to liability
for ones designs. Should degrees of liability be directly
proportional to the innovative structural character of a design?
This may seem eminently fair yet it is likely to have a stifling
effect on experimental designthe net effect of which could
be negative social utility.
A third sort of ethical problem arises because architectural practice
is a form of business. For example, in the state of affairs before
contractual obligations arise, an architects reasonable preference
to have a plan developed may lead to inventive marketing schemes
which creatively omit design elements, particularly in innovative
designs. When does this become outright misrepresentation, actionable
in a court of law and sanctionable by the AIA? Is it ethically acceptable
at any point until then?
Susan Maxman, How the Law Relates to Architecture,
in New York State Bar Journal 66 (May-June, 1994) 4.
Andrew S. Pollock, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act: Analysis of Probable Ramifications and Arising Issues
in Nebraska Law Review 70 (Fall 1991) 4.
Robert Frank Cushman and G. Christian Hedemann, Architect and
Engineer Liability: Claims against Design Professionals (Wiley,
1995); see ch. 11, Ownership and Reuse of Design Professionals
Designs, and ch. 12, Liability for Innovative but Unproven
Other Philosophical Literature
David Goldblatt, The Dislocation of the Architectural Self,
in JAAC 49: 4.
David Goldblatt, The Frequency of Architectural Acts: Diversity
and Quantity in Architecture, in JAAC 46: 1.
Gordon Graham, Art and Architecture, in British Journal
of Aesthetics 29 (1989).
John J. Haldane, Aesthetic Naturalism and the Decline of Architecture,
in International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 2 and
3 (1987, 1988).
Roberto Masiero and Vittorio Ugo, Epistemological Remarks
on Architecture, in Epistemologia 14 (1991).
Anthony OHear, Historicism and Architectural Knowledge,
in Philosophy 68 (1993).
Patrick Suppes, Rules of Proportion in Architecture,
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1991).
Edward Winters, Technological Progress and Architectural Response,
in British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1991).
Robert E. Wood, Architecture: The Confluence of Art, Technology,
Politics, and Nature, in American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 70 (1996: S).
Philosophical Works by Architects
Justus Dahinden, Architektur und Philosophie, in Deutsches
Architektenblatt 22 1 (March, 1990).
Sue Hendler (ed.), Planning Ethics: A Reader in Planning Theory,
Practice, and Education (Center for Urban Policy Research, 1995).
Alan Holgate, Aesthetics of Built Form (Oxford University
Louise Pelletier and Alberto Pérez Gómez (eds.), Architecture,
Ethics and Technology (McGill-Queens University Press,
Colin St. John Wilson, Architectural Reflections: Studies in
the Philosophy and Practice of Architecture.
Christiane Younès and Michel Mangematin, Le Philosophe
chez lArchitecte (Paris: Descartes, 1996).
Ethics and Architecture. Special issue of Via 10 (1990).
Philosophy & Architecture. Special issue of the
Journal of Philosophy and the Visual Arts 2 (1990).
Philosophy and Architectural History
Claudia Brodsky-Lacour, Lines of Thought: Discourse, Architectonics,
and the Origin of Modern Philosophy (Durham: Duke University
David Smith Capon, Architectural Theory: The Vitruvian Fallacy
(New York: Wiley, 1999).
Demetri Porphyrios, Selected Aspects of Architecture and Philosophy
in 18th Century Theory, International Architect 1 4
Joseph Rykwert, The First Modems: the Architects of the Eighteenth
Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980).
Christine Smith, Architecture in the Culture of Early Humanism:
Ethics, Aesthetics, and Eloquence, 1400-1470 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
Allen S.Weiss, Mirrors of Infinity: The French Formal Garden
and 17th Century Metaphysics (Princeton: Princeton Architectural
Thomas A. Dutton, Cultural Studies and Critical Pedagogy:
Cultural Pedagogy and Architecture, in Thomas A. Dutton and
Lian Hurst Mann (eds), Reconstructing Architecture: Critical
Resources and Social Practices (University of Minnesota Press,
Charles Jencks, and Karl Kropf (eds). Theories and Manifestoes
of Contemporary Architecture. (Wiley, 1997).
Paul-Allen Johnson. The Theory of ArchitectureConcepts,
Themes, and Practices (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1994).
Hanno-Walter Kruft. A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius
to the Present (Princeton University Press, 1994).
Kate Nesbitt. Theorizing Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural
Theory (Princeton Architectural Press, 1996).
Joan Ockman. Architecture Culture 1943-1968: A Documentary Anthology
Gertrude Himmelfarb, Jeremy Benthams Haunted House,
in Victorian Minds (Knopf, 1968).
Colin St. John Wilson, The Play of Use and the Use of Play:
an Interpretation of Wittgensteins Comments on Architecture,
Architectural Review 180.1073 (July 1986).
Janet Semple, Benthams Prison: A Study of the Panopticon
Penitentiary (Oxford University Press, 1993).
B. R. Tilghman, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect, by Paul
Wijdeveld, JAAC 53 (Fall).
Paul Wijdeveld, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect (MIT Press,
Architecture and the Law
Gregory A. Ashe, Reflecting the Best of our Aspirations: Protecting
Modern and Post-Modern Architecture, in Cardozo Arts and Entertainment
Law Journal 15 (Spring, 1997) 1.
Andrea Burns, The Legal Obligations of the Architect (Butterworths,
Clark T. Thiel, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Gesture
of 1990, Or, Hey, That Looks Like My Building!, in
DePaul-LCA Journal of Art & Entertainment Law 7 (Fall 1996)
Raleigh W. Newsam II, Architecture and Copyright-Separating the
Poetic from the Prosaic, in Tulane Law Review 71 (March,
Justin Sweet, Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering and the
Construction Process, 5th ed. (West, 1994).