Analytic Philosophy of Architecture: A Course

Saul Fisher

My idea for a course in analytic philosophy of architecture was the product of long- term, slow-burner inspiration, which began roughly with reading Scruton’s The Aes thetics of Architecture and reviewing the available literature. These efforts revealed that there is no significant body of work in the field—in short, that there is no such field. To begin to correct the situation, one might seed interest in architectural aesthetics (and ethics) among budding analytic philosophers, and in analytic aesthetics (and ethics) among budding architects. Certainly work in this vein was not springing forth from the deep wells of philosophical aesthetics. Two decades after Scruton’s first book on architecture, there has been no more than a smattering of articles on architecture in aesthetics journals (and another book by Scruton—this one leaning more towards criticism). The field remains largely underdeveloped, and ripe for exploration. All the better to explore with the fresh perspective students bring.

Not everyone subscribes to the philosophical enrichment theory of curricular innovation, though. A primary hurdle in teaching analytic philosophy of architecture is convincing architects, philosophers, or deans that the subject merits a piece of the students’ course loads. Students themselves are an easier sell, perhaps, because they do not have a historically-informed notion of what their instruction should look like. The great difficulty of teaching this material, though, is finding the right pitch to a mix of philosophy and architecture students. That there is no tremendous range of directly relevant literature in analytic aesthetics need not be an obstacle in this regard. One solution is to provide general introductions to subfields of aesthetics—representation, intention, and identity, for example—and examine their applicability to and lessons for (and from) architecture. With respect to architectural ethics, one may look to architectural law to determine some of the pertinent moral issues. The current thin state of the literature forces the instructor to rely on readings of a broad, non-technical nature—quite suitable for an interdisciplinary student audience.

Finally, a word on pedagogy. Such courses as are taught to architecture or arts students sometimes substitute visual-medium projects for written projects as a basis for assessing performance. The thinking seems to be that this is what is comfortable for arts and architecture students—a sentiment not terribly far from “if they could express themselves in writing, they wouldn’t have set out to do visual arts”. We have a special responsibility to these students, precisely because they have chosen to work in a visual, non-discursive medium. We owe them an opportunity to better their written skills—and critical thinking—for they may get no further formal training in these abilities. We should also expect them to have missed much of the point of the philosophical enterprise should they never get a chance to ‘think’ philosophically through the pen or keyboard.

Course Outline and Syllabus

This course is an introduction to philosophy of architecture in the analytic philosophical tradition. The philosophy of architecture incorporates not only aesthetics but also ethical aspects of architecture. In the main, though, the aim of philosophy of architecture is to see how the pressing questions of aesthetics are translated into architectural terms: What is an architectural work? Are there architectural classes or types? What is the role of intentionality and expression for architects? What are rationally-justifiable foundations for architectural criticism? The relevant ethical issues include the delineation of rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and justice in architectural milieux. There are, in addition, philosophical issues arising out of the non-artistic facets of architecture; these include architecture’s social and technological characteristics. Some of these issues may seem familiar, either from writings in architectural theory or some other corner of architectural studies. But the approach of analytic philosophy to these issues will be generally unfamiliar unless one has a background in philosophy. This novelty is offered in the spirit of discovery and exploration of uncharted territory—which may be complimentary to the tradition of architectural theory but is in any case not to be construed as an attempt to offer a substitute for or corrective to it.

Why the Philosophy of Architecture?

Quite apart from the body of work that is architectural theory, an interest in architecture has been emerging over the past few years among professional philosophers. For architects, this philosophical work represents a new and challenging intellectual frontier, for several reasons. First, some of the most interesting new work is in what is loosely known as the “analytic” tradition, that is, the tradition of Western philosophy which places a high premium on rigorous argumentation which optimally employs the tools of logic and critical reasoning. In short, the literature of this branch of philosophy tends towards the technical side of things, and so is often perceived as unavailable to all but its fervent devotees (not unlike, say, contemporary Western art music in the serial and “post-serial” traditions). Second, while architects may have some familiarity with analytic aesthetics, this knowledge has not been adequately utilized in either the theory or practice of architecture. By contrast, philosophers working in the “continental” tradition have been recognized for their insights into such subjects as what it means to experience architecture, and the social ramifications of architectural practice. That element of Western philosophy may indeed seem less rarified and more pertinent to the real world of architecture (theory or practice).

However these perceptions of a philosophy of architecture may have arisen, in the end professional architects should take note of what analytic philosophers are saying—and what they should be saying. Architectural theorists have a manifest interest in learning about the efforts of analytic aestheticians to address such topics as the essential nature of art and the identification of a given artwork. With respect to the specialized nature of analytic aesthetics, there is indeed an obstacle to quickly learning about it and its relevance for architecture, because the field truly is ‘technical’, which is to say that it features its own techniques. A semester-long course should do the trick. Finally, continental aesthetics is no more relevant to architectural thought than is analytic aesthetics. Without debating the merits or flaws of continental philosophy, it should be conceded that, for all its literary and alogical (not illogical) characteristics, continental philosophy is more ready-to-hand than is analytic philosophy. It does not follow that it is any more pertinent or intellectually stimulating for architects—and this lesson has not been lost on philosophers in the academy. The price of avoiding analytic aesthetics is missing out on aesthetics in the dominant tradition of Western philosophical thought, and that seems an unfair cost for non-philosophers to burden.

It is only fair for architects to turn to analytic philosophers at this point and ask where they have been all these years, and the answer may be bluntly put as “out to lunch”. To the extent that aestheticians focus on special arts (that is, instead of talking about the arts generally), they have focused largely on literature, painting, and music. In more recent years, film and dance have sparked some interest (there is a decent web site on the former, by the way) but architecture remains largely in the analytic philosophical wilderness. Failing any rational explanation (and I fear there is none), let us turn to the irrational suggestion some philosophers might make that they do not have an intrinsic interest in architecture, for it is simply part of their general material environment which prima facie cannot compete with the realm of ideas. This sort of view is one part homage to the Socratic academic ideal of renouncing material interests in favor of purer philosophizing, and one part intellectual chic. It makes little sense on either count, because architecture is surely the first place (or at least the first art form) where the ideal is incorporated into the material. Perhaps a more plausible ‘explanation’ (that is, excuse) is simply that, for whatever reasons, there is no strong pre-existing tradition of philosophy of architecture. Let us begin one, then.

Unit One: Aesthetics and Architecture—Rudiments and Essentials

Week One. What is philosophical aesthetics, and how is it distinct from other approaches to aesthetics (e.g. psychological, social/commercial, historical/stylistic)?
As a first step, it is a good idea to familiarize ourselves with the general project of philosophical aesthetics. While architecture is not traditionally a central concern for philosophers in the analytic tradition, many of the issues raised in analytic aesthetics globally have direct applications locally in architecture, which we will try to tease out in this course.

Anne Sheppard, Aesthetics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art (Oxford University Press, 1987).
Arnold Isenberg, “Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art”, in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (herein JAAC) 46.

Week Two. Where is architecture in classical and contemporary aesthetics?
What do aestheticians in the analytic tradition typically think of architecture? Given the relative dearth of analytic writing on architecture, the answer might seem to be “not much”. In what little discussion there is of architecture in analytic aesthetics, the default position is apparently that architecture is so close a relative of the plastic arts (painting, sculpture) as to warrant the subsumption of the former under the latter. We might immediately recognize that architecture’s foundational features and conceptual problems cannot be wholly assimilated to those of the plastic arts. But what is the exact sense in which they are independent? Might they resemble the features and problems of some other area of inquiry, such as the environment, as some have suggested?

Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture (Princeton University Press, 1979), chs 1 & 2.
Allen Carlson, “Reconsidering the Aesthetics of Architecture”, in Journal of Aesthetic Education 20 (Winter, 1986).
F. David Martin, “Architecture and the Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Environment”, in JAAC 38: 2.

Week Three. A metaphysical commencement—what is architecture, as practice and product?
A philosophical approach to architecture must offer, at an early stage, at least some tentative suggestion as to what architecture is, for several reasons. One, we should see whether architecture truly needs to be considered as distinctive from other arts in philosophically-significant ways. Two, architecture, like other arts, has process and product dimensions, and even if architecture otherwise resembled other arts generally, there is no prima facie reason to believe that these dimensions vary in just the way they do in other arts (and our experience tends to confirm this). This implies that suggestions as to what architecture is are needed in order that we keep in sight our subject matter (for further metaphysical discussion), whichever it is.

Stephen Davies, “Is Architecture Art?”, in Michael Mitias (ed.), Philosophy and Architecture (Rodopi, 1994).
Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, ch 3.

Unit Two: Metaphysics in Full Bloom

Week Four. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for being an architectural work?
What are the essential hallmarks of a given individual architectural work, such that we can identify (a) when some x is a work of architecture (and not anything else, e.g. sculpture) and (b) when some x is a particular work of architecture (and not any other)? Are these hallmarks: conventional, subject to change, conceptually or empirically-determined, rule-governed?

Nelson Goodman, “When is Art?” in Ways of Worldmaking (Hackett, 1978).
Catherine Lord, “A Kripkean Approach to the Identity of a Work of Art”, in JAAC 36: 2.
Michael Mitias, “Ambiguities in Identifying the Work of Art”, in JAAC 38: 1.
Robert Wicks, “Architectural Restoration: Resurrection or Replication?”, in British Journal of Aesthetics 34: 2.

Week Five. Are there classes of buildings or building-types?
We often take it for granted that buildings fall into classes or types: skyscrapers, colonial houses, news kiosks, etc. Some aestheticians suggest, however, that there are only individuals, and no classes of any kind. How could this possibly be true of architecture? Would it make a difference to architectural practice if it were true?

Nikolas Pevsner, A History of Building Types (Princeton University Press, 1976).
Alan Colquhoun, “Typology and Design Method”, in Essays in Architectural Criticism (MIT Press, 1981).
Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Toward an Ontology of Art Works”, in Noûs 9 (May, 1975).
Richard Wollheim, “Are the Criteria of Identity for Works of Art Aesthetically Relevant?”, in Art and its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1980).

Week Six. Architectural predicates—and their metaphysical underpinnings.
Philosophers often use the term ‘predicate’ to talk about qualities, features, or properties. The idea is to remain neutral in speaking about the actual existence of qualities, features, or properties, as opposed, for example, to the existence of the objects they characterize. This neutrality is accomplished by referring to a given quality of an object y (say, the redness of y) in terms of a corresponding predicate, say r, where r is the predicate “is red”). Then we can say y is characterized by r without committing to the existence of r. What is motivating the device is the worry that talk of qualities as existing somethings is absurd, though many arguments have been advanced for the opposing view, too, and in those cases the burden is to show exactly how we may speak of qualities existing.

So, too, for the special architectural predicates—most prominently, light, space, and form—and those aesthetic predicates architecture shares with other art forms (color, shape (generally), size, etc.). How do these predicates characterize the architectural work? Do they refer to existing qualities? How do we determine what qualities there are in a work, and which are the most important in a given work?

Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts”, in Philosophical Review 68 (October, 1959).
Oswald Hanfling, “Aesthetic Qualities”, in Oswald Hanfling (ed.), Philosophical Aesthetics (Blackwell, 1992).
Michael Mitias, “The Aesthetics of the Architectural Work”, Unpublished ms.
Louis Hammer, “Architecture and the Poetry of Space”, in JAAC 39: 4.

Unit Three: Content and Value: From Thought to Building, and Back Again

Week Seven. Intentions and Intentionality.
It is a commonplace of thinking about architecture that one’s designs are a direct means of representing one’s underlying intentions, even if those intentions are construed in purely formal or style-bound terms. As a consequence of this view, it is also commonly held that buildings generally have an identifiable significance or meaning. But are these theses detachable? Is there in fact a defensible argument for either? In particular, what should architects make of the suggestion by some aestheticians that there is no fool-proof way to attach intentions to a given artwork, and that the exercise is pointless in any case? What, in short, does architecture (as product or process) look like without a premium on intentions?

William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy”, in Joseph Margolis (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts, 3rd ed. (Temple University Press, 1987).
Nelson Goodman, “How Buildings Mean” in Philip Alperson (ed.), The Philosophy of the Visual Arts (Oxford University Press, 1992).

Week Eight. Architectural Expression.
There is a tendency to take ‘expression’ in architecture at face value, as in the phrase “Ledoux’s work expresses the Enlightenment ideals of his age.” That is, we generally understand ‘expression’ as synonymous with the rather vague term, ‘communication’. Why is this excessively vague? If we ask how Ledoux’s work communicates anything, given that it is literally a set of drawings or stones piled up in a particular arrangement, we have at least the hint of a puzzle. Some may be tempted at this point to simile: the work communicates some thought(s) x just as, for example, a red octagonal sign with the word ‘stop’ communicates the imperative form of ‘to stop’. This is a plausible beginning of a semiotic account of expression but it should be noted at the outset that the whole enterprise rests on an analogy posited with actual signs. Several serious accounts directly assess the concepts and relations constitutive of expression without resting on analogy, and so these merit our attention. These include seeing expression as (1) a formal relation between aesthetic predicates and the way they are instantiated (that is, realized in the actual world), (2) a behavior-like phenomenon (verging on analogy, to be sure), and (3) a causal relation between aesthetic predicates and the cognitive or emotive properties they arouse in spectators. Do any of these fit a reasonable characterization of architectural expression?

“Art, Expression in”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement. (Macmillan Reference USA and Simon & Schuster and Prentice Hall International, 1996).
Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, ch 8.
Michael Mitias, “Expression in Architecture”, in Michael Mitias (ed.), Philosophy and Architecture.
Saul Fisher, “‘Expression’ in Architecture”. Unpublished ms.

Week Nine. Traditional perspectives on architectural criticism: Stylistic frameworks, formalism, and socio-political analysis.
The philosophy of art often characterizes artworks as individuals without regard to any others. One motivation for this is that we ought to be able to grasp the salient features of, for example, the Steiner Haus, should we find it as a free-standing structure in Alpha Centauri. This in turn suggests that consideration of stylistic frameworks and socio-political environment are, at least philosophically-speaking, beside the point. Yet it is not clear that, from this perspective, formalism does much better. After all, if we really did discover an interesting architectural work in a nearby galaxy, it wouldn’t occur to us to assess it in wholly formal terms because of the remaining and sizable questions as to how it got there, and why. Much traditional architectural criticism therefore comes under deep suspicion from a variety of philosophical perspectives. Two questions arise: is there a possible philosophical defense of any such critical framework, and if not, can architecture do without?

Jenefer M. Robinson, “Style and Significance in Art History and Art Criticism”, in JAAC 40: 1.
Deane W. Curtin, “Varieties of Aesthetic Formalism”, in JAAC 40: 3.
Roger Scruton, “Tafuri’s Marxism”, and “Architectural Principles”, in The Classical Vernacular: Architectural Principles in an Age of Nihilism (St. Martin’s Press, 1994).

Week Ten. Architectural criticism—The case-study as a philosophical approach.
Some three decades ago, Peter Collins proposed that architectural analysis and criticism might be fruitfully modeled on the case-study approach—then best known in law and elements of the social sciences, and currently a staple of systems analysis and management studies. His view begins with the suggestion that each architectural work is an atomic individual the features of which are not necessarily designed in accordance with particular principles and which neither depend on past works nor determine future works in any essential or fixed fashion. Yet the features of any given work exemplify the salient particular consequences of and guideposts to greater, abstract principles. Thus we can build an understanding of architectural principles—or architecture, simply—by gleaning the lessons of past works, which will shape our future designs through precedence and innovation, by turns and temperament. The analogy with law is clear enough, but what are its merits and flaws in an architectural setting?

Peter Collins, Architectural Judgement (Faber, 1971).

Unit Four: Special Topics in Philosophy of Architecture

Week Eleven. Logic, language, and notation: Why there can’t be a language of architecture—and what there can be.
Summerson, Zevi, Jencks, and many, many others talk of a ‘language of architecture’. But does this concept make any sense? Is it even a useful metaphor? Even if there is no point to talk of a ‘language of architecture’, there is apparently one sense in which architects must be interested in language, or linguistic phenomena, at any rate. Like other artists, designers, and creators, architects require a system of notation which allows for the preservation of a work’s identity, and it seems that any such system exhibits certain well-defined syntactic and semantic features, in a manner analogous to those we associate with natural, logical, or computer languages. What should such a ‘language’ for architecture look like?

Scruton, Aesthetics of Architecture, ch 7.
Martin Donougho, “The Language of Architecture”, in Journal of Aesthetic Education 21: 3 (Fall, 1987).
Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Hackett, 1976).
William Mitchell, The Logic of Architecture (MIT Press, 1990).

Week Twelve. Architecture and the social: How is whatever distinguishes the social from the individual manifested in an architectural work?
Architecture is apparently unlike the other arts in that we tend to associate it with a social function. But what, if anything, makes architecture intrinsically ‘social’? Is it simply that the provision of shelter is generally not a self-sufficient affair? These considerations help address foundational issues underlying next week’s subject: whether the social nature of architecture endows architects with special social responsibilities.

John Greenwood, “The Mark of the Social”, in John Greenwood (ed.), The Mark of the Social: Discovery or Invention? (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997).
John J. Haldane, “Architecture, Philosophy, and the Public World”, in British Journal of Aesthetics 30: 3 (July, 1990).
B. R. Tilghman, “Architecture, Expression and the Understanding of a Culture” in Michael Mitias (ed.), Philosophy and Architecture.
Saul Fisher, “Is Architecture a ‘Social’ Art?” Unpublished ms.

Week Thirteen. Architectural ethics, part one: responsibilities, rights, and utility.
Responsibilities. We begin with a look at the AIA Code of Ethics, which outlines obligations of architects, generally to other persons, based on general canons which entail goals enshrined in ethical standards, which are in turn further specified in binding rules. Do the rules ensure that the given standards will be met? Are those standards, or the canons on which they are based, reasonable to begin with? What fundamental principles should motivate the choice of canons? Further, very little (though not nothing) is said in the AIA Code about historic preservation or environmental protection (“cultural and natural heritage”)—what ethical considerations are relevant here?

Rights. Who or what has rights, why, and whose trump whose: environments, communities, developers, builders, engineers, architects… buildings? Utility. The social character of architecture pits general utility consideration against the preferences of the individual creator—the architect (these are now known as ‘tilted arc’ cases, after the controversy over Richard Serra’s work). How can preferences be weighed justly in making controversial architectural decisions?

American Institute of Architects. “Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct” <http://www.e-architect.com/institute/codeethics.asp>.
Francis Sparshott, “The Aesthetics of Architecture and the Politics of Space”, in Michael Mitias (ed.), Philosophy and Architecture.
Saul Fisher, “How to Think About the Ethics of Architecture”, in Warwick Fox (ed.), The Ethics of Building (forthcoming).

Week Fourteen. Architectural ethics, part two: Principled considerations of architectural law and business ethics for practices.
The law protects intellectual, domestic, and commercial property, all to varying degrees and on the basis of quite distinctive principles. This presents a problem for architects in that the principles involved easily clash and thus generate dilemmas of an ethical and legal nature. For example, if x’s design D for a townhouse is bought by developer y and built by contractor z, D remains the intellectual property of x but is instantiated in the commercial property of y, whose changes in D apparently violate the integrity of x’s creation. One may fruitfully compare the ensuing problems which have emerged in the colorization of classic films. Aside from the rights and damages questions which arise in legal considerations, there are questions of the good (e.g. social or aesthetic utility) and preference-weighting which are ethical at root.

Another set of ethical problems arises with respect to liability for one’s designs. Should degrees of liability be directly proportional to the innovative structural character of a design? This may seem eminently fair yet it is likely to have a stifling effect on experimental design—the net effect of which could be negative social utility.

A third sort of ethical problem arises because architectural practice is a form of business. For example, in the state of affairs before contractual obligations arise, an architect’s reasonable preference to have a plan developed may lead to inventive marketing schemes which creatively omit design elements, particularly in innovative designs. When does this become outright misrepresentation, actionable in a court of law and sanctionable by the AIA? Is it ethically acceptable at any point until then?

Susan Maxman, “How the Law Relates to Architecture”, in New York State Bar Journal 66 (May-June, 1994) 4.
Andrew S. Pollock, “The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act: Analysis of Probable Ramifications and Arising Issues” in Nebraska Law Review 70 (Fall 1991) 4.
Robert Frank Cushman and G. Christian Hedemann, Architect and Engineer Liability: Claims against Design Professionals (Wiley, 1995); see ch. 11, “Ownership and Reuse of Design Professionals’ Designs”, and ch. 12, “Liability for Innovative but Unproven Designs”.

Further Resources

Other Philosophical Literature

David Goldblatt, “The Dislocation of the Architectural Self”, in JAAC 49: 4.
David Goldblatt, “The Frequency of Architectural Acts: Diversity and Quantity in Architecture”, in JAAC 46: 1.
Gordon Graham, “Art and Architecture”, in British Journal of Aesthetics 29 (1989).
John J. Haldane, “Aesthetic Naturalism and the Decline of Architecture”, in International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 2 and 3 (1987, 1988).
Roberto Masiero and Vittorio Ugo, “Epistemological Remarks on Architecture”, in Epistemologia 14 (1991).
Anthony O’Hear, “Historicism and Architectural Knowledge”, in Philosophy 68 (1993).
Patrick Suppes, “Rules of Proportion in Architecture”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1991).
Edward Winters, “Technological Progress and Architectural Response”, in British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1991).
Robert E. Wood, “Architecture: The Confluence of Art, Technology, Politics, and Nature”, in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1996: S).

Philosophical Works by Architects

Justus Dahinden, “Architektur und Philosophie”, in Deutsches Architektenblatt 22 1 (March, 1990).
Sue Hendler (ed.), Planning Ethics: A Reader in Planning Theory, Practice, and Education (Center for Urban Policy Research, 1995).
Alan Holgate, Aesthetics of Built Form (Oxford University Press, 1992).
Louise Pelletier and Alberto Pérez Gómez (eds.), Architecture, Ethics and Technology (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994).
Colin St. John Wilson, Architectural Reflections: Studies in the Philosophy and Practice of Architecture.
Christiane Younès and Michel Mangematin, Le Philosophe chez l’Architecte (Paris: Descartes, 1996).
Ethics and Architecture”. Special issue of Via 10 (1990).
“Philosophy & Architecture”. Special issue of the Journal of Philosophy and the Visual Arts 2 (1990).

Philosophy and Architectural History

Claudia Brodsky-Lacour, Lines of Thought: Discourse, Architectonics, and the Origin of Modern Philosophy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996).
David Smith Capon, Architectural Theory: The Vitruvian Fallacy (New York: Wiley, 1999).
Demetri Porphyrios, “Selected Aspects of Architecture and Philosophy in 18th Century Theory”, International Architect 1 4 (1981).
Joseph Rykwert, The First Modems: the Architects of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980).
Christine Smith, Architecture in the Culture of Early Humanism: Ethics, Aesthetics, and Eloquence, 1400-1470 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Allen S.Weiss, Mirrors of Infinity: The French Formal Garden and 17th Century Metaphysics (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1995).

Architectural Theory

Thomas A. Dutton, “Cultural Studies and Critical Pedagogy: Cultural Pedagogy and Architecture”, in Thomas A. Dutton and Lian Hurst Mann (eds), Reconstructing Architecture: Critical Resources and Social Practices (University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
Charles Jencks, and Karl Kropf (eds). Theories and Manifestoes of Contemporary Architecture. (Wiley, 1997).
Paul-Allen Johnson. The Theory of Architecture—Concepts, Themes, and Practices (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1994).
Hanno-Walter Kruft. A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present (Princeton University Press, 1994).
Kate Nesbitt. Theorizing Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory (Princeton Architectural Press, 1996).
Joan Ockman. Architecture Culture 1943-1968: A Documentary Anthology (Rizzoli, 1993).

Philosopher-Architects

Gertrude Himmelfarb, “Jeremy Bentham’s Haunted House”, in Victorian Minds (Knopf, 1968).
Colin St. John Wilson, “The Play of Use and the Use of Play: an Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Comments on Architecture”, Architectural Review 180.1073 (July 1986).
Janet Semple, Bentham’s Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary (Oxford University Press, 1993).
B. R. Tilghman, “Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect”, by Paul Wijdeveld, JAAC 53 (Fall).
Paul Wijdeveld, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect (MIT Press, 1994).

Architecture and the Law

Gregory A. Ashe, “Reflecting the Best of our Aspirations: Protecting Modern and Post-Modern Architecture”, in Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 15 (Spring, 1997) 1.
Andrea Burns, The Legal Obligations of the Architect (Butterworths, 1994).
Clark T. Thiel, “The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Gesture of 1990, Or, “Hey, That Looks Like My Building!”“, in DePaul-LCA Journal of Art & Entertainment Law 7 (Fall 1996) 1.
Raleigh W. Newsam II, “Architecture and Copyright-Separating the Poetic from the Prosaic”, in Tulane Law Review 71 (March, 1997) 4.
Justin Sweet, Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering and the Construction Process, 5th ed. (West, 1994).